- Japan's capacity market main auction, run by OCCTO, secures supply capability (kW) four years ahead; batteries can bid from 1,000 kW.
- The overall average unit price has risen every round since Round 2 (¥3,109/kW), reaching a record ¥13,303/kW in Round 6 (FY2029).
- Batteries win over 96% of what they bid, but contracts run one year and prices move by year and area, so revenue is stacked with JEPX and the balancing market.
What the Capacity Market Main Auction Is — A Market That Secures Future Supply Capability
The capacity market is run by the Organization for Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators, Japan (OCCTO) to secure future supply capability (kW) in advance. It differs both from JEPX, where electrical energy (kWh) itself is bought and sold, and from the supply and demand balancing market, where balancing capacity (ΔkW) for raising or lowering output is traded: what the capacity market buys is "the existence, in a specified year, of the generating and discharging capability that will be needed." A resource is paid for being available as supply capability and standing ready, whether or not it actually runs.
At its center is the main auction, held four years before the delivery year. Batteries can take part from 1,000 kW or more; the auction uses a single price (the price of the last successful bidder applies to everyone), and contracts are in principle for one year (a single fiscal year). Existing and new resources compete on the same footing, which is the fundamental difference from the LDA (Long-Term Decarbonized Power Source Auction), which is open to new builds only.
• JEPX (wholesale electricity market) … Electrical energy (kWh) is bought and sold. The arena for arbitrage — charging when prices are low and discharging when they are high.
• Balancing market (operated by EPRX) … Balancing capacity (ΔkW = standby) is traded. Payment for waiting in a state where output can be raised or lowered.
• Capacity market (operated by OCCTO) … Secures future supply capability (kW). Fixed capacity revenue for availability.
This article focuses on the third, the capacity market, and within it the main auction. For the overall picture of how the three markets are combined (stacking), see The 3 Revenue Sources of Batteries.
How Clearing Prices Have Moved — From a Sharp Fall to a Rise
Main auction prices have swung widely from Round 1 to Round 6. The Round 1 clearing price (¥14,137/kW) was a high price close to the upper end of the demand curve; in Round 2 (¥3,495/kW) it fell sharply to about a quarter of that, and it has been on an upward trend since. Behind this is the growth of new electricity demand, such as data centers and semiconductor plants.
| Round | Delivery year | Overall average unit price (after deduction for transitional measures) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Round 1 | FY2024 | ¥9,534/kW | Clearing price a uniform ¥14,137/kW nationwide. Criticized for being close to the upper end of the demand curve |
| Round 2 | FY2025 | ¥3,109/kW | Clearing price ¥3,495/kW (¥5,242 in Hokkaido and Kyushu), a sharp fall to about 1/4 of the previous round |
| Round 3 | FY2026 | ¥5,226/kW | Market splitting by area occurred |
| Round 4 | FY2027 | ¥7,847/kW | Turned to an upward trend |
| Round 5 | FY2028 | ¥11,134/kW | Total contracted amount approx. ¥1.8506 trillion |
| Round 6 | FY2029 | ¥13,303/kW | New record high. Total contracted amount approx. ¥2.2094 trillion. Areas split into 4 blocks |
The overall average unit price in Round 6 (delivery year FY2029), whose results came out on January 20, 2026, was ¥13,303/kW (after the deduction for transitional measures), above even Round 5's ¥11,134. The total contracted amount, approximately ¥2.2094 trillion, is the highest on record. For the first time apart from Round 1, area prices exceeded the indicative price (¥10,075/kW) in every area. That prices move widely from one year to the next is inherent to the main auction, where capacity revenue is won anew at each annual renewal; since it is not a long-term fixed income, a business has to be designed with this volatility itself built in.
Unit Prices Split by Area — Location Decides Capacity Revenue
Since Round 3, the capacity market has cleared not as a single national market but split by area. In Round 5 (delivery year FY2028), the gaps in unit price between areas are decisively large. Build the same battery, and its annual revenue from the capacity market changes greatly depending on the area where it is placed.
| Area | Clearing unit price (¥/kW) | Relative to the price cap |
|---|---|---|
| Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo | ¥14,812/kW | Cleared at the price cap |
| Kyushu | ¥13,177/kW | 89% of the cap |
| Chubu | ¥10,280/kW | 69% of the cap |
| Hokuriku, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku | ¥8,785/kW | 59% of the cap |
In Round 5, the gap between the highest areas (Hokkaido, Tohoku and Tokyo at ¥14,812/kW, pinned to the price cap) and the lowest (Hokuriku, Kansai, Chugoku and Shikoku at ¥8,785/kW) was about 70%. Because capacity market revenue is a fixed income per kW, this gap in unit price feeds straight through as a gap in annual revenue. When people say that in battery economics "location is everything," it is because not only grid connection costs but also these area characteristics of the capacity market and the balancing market act in combination. Location assessment that also draws on balancing market data by area is covered in The 3 Revenue Sources of Batteries as well.
In Round 6 (delivery year FY2029), the areas split into four blocks: Hokkaido / Tohoku and Tokyo / Kyushu / Chubu, Hokuriku, Kansai, Chugoku and Shikoku. The gap between the highest and the lowest narrowed to about 20%. Tohoku and Tokyo remained short of supply capability even after the additional clearing procedure, and became shortage areas for the second year running.
| Area | Clearing unit price (¥/kW) |
|---|---|
| Kyushu | ¥15,112/kW |
| Tohoku, Tokyo | ¥15,111/kW |
| Hokkaido | ¥14,972/kW |
| Chubu, Hokuriku, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku | ¥12,388/kW |
How It Feeds Through to Battery Revenue — Base Income "Simply for Being Available"
For a battery, capacity revenue from the main auction is the most stable income it has: it "comes in even without running." The award rate for batteries is over 96%, so almost all of the volume offered is awarded; once a battery takes part, capacity revenue is all but certain. Stacking JEPX arbitrage and balancing market revenue on top of this base income is the basic form of revenue design for the main-auction (full merchant) model.
• Award rate over 96% — almost all of the volume offered is awarded, so little capacity revenue is missed
• Contracts are in principle for one year — directly exposed to the year-to-year movement of the clearing price (not a long-term fixed income)
• No restriction on revenue from other markets — all JEPX and balancing market revenue is kept
• Minimum capacity 1,000 kW — small projects can take part too
Note, however, that the main auction is a scheme in which "you keep everything, and in exchange carry the year-to-year price risk yourself." If a swing like the sharp fall from Round 1 to Round 2 occurs, capacity revenue for that year shrinks substantially. In a phase of rising prices it is a tailwind, but a design that leans revenue on the capacity market alone is high-risk; it only works on the premise of stacking with JEPX and the balancing market.
Because the main auction uses single-year contracts, the clearing price moves every year. Sharp falls such as Round 1's ¥14,137 → Round 2's ¥3,495 have actually happened. Capacity revenue is only a base; if you want LDA-level revenue stability, that is a different scheme altogether.
If you want to lock in revenue with 20 years of fixed income, the LDA; if you want to go after the year-to-year price movements while keeping all revenue from other markets, the main auction — that is how the two divide.
Few Batteries Bid into the Main Auction
Despite the high award rate of over 96%, the battery capacity bidding into the main auction is very small. Battery bids in the main auction remain at about 0.1% of the total (about 240,000 kW), and most large batteries have gone to the LDA in pursuit of 20 years of fixed income.
This is not "because the main auction is unpopular." For new large batteries, the LDA's 20 years of fixed income, which makes project finance easier to arrange, suits fundraising better. Put the other way, for existing batteries and for projects below 30,000 kW that do not reach the LDA's minimum capacity, the main auction is the realistic option for earning capacity revenue. Existing batteries cannot take part in the LDA (new builds only) in the first place, so for them the main auction is the only choice.
• Existing batteries (the LDA is for new builds only, so they cannot take part)
• Projects below 30,000 kW (they do not reach the LDA's minimum bid capacity)
• Full merchant businesses with market-trading know-how that can take on price risk
For new large-scale projects, or where long-term stable income comes first, the analysis centers on the LDA side. A 7-point comparison of the two schemes is in Main Auction vs LDA.
Where the Main Auction and the LDA Stand
Although they sit under the same "capacity market" umbrella, the main auction and the LDA differ fundamentally in design philosophy. This article focuses on the main auction side, but the decision to take part is always made by contrasting the two.
| Item | Main auction | LDA |
|---|---|---|
| Contract period | In principle 1 year (single fiscal year) | In principle 20 years |
| Method | Single price (uniform) | Multi-price (pay-as-bid) |
| Eligible resources | All resources, existing and new | New builds, replacements and refurbishments only |
| Minimum capacity for batteries | 1,000 kW | 30,000 kW (from Round 2) |
| Revenue from other markets | No restriction (kept in full) | Obligation to refund most of it |
| Award rate for batteries | Over 96% | About 20–46% (Rounds 1–3) |
The main auction is a market that "secures next year's supply capability, including keeping existing resources in service"; the LDA is a market that "guarantees new decarbonized resources 20 years of investment recovery." The question is not which is better: the best answer changes with whether the battery is existing or new, its size, the owner's risk tolerance and how it is financed. The details of the LDA's 20 years of fixed income and its refund rules are in What Is the LDA (Long-Term Decarbonized Power Source Auction)?, and a framework for deciding between the two schemes is set out in detail in Main Auction vs LDA.
Frequently Asked Questions
The big picture on this topic: Japan Capacity Market, LDA & Tolling Guide →